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1. 
BACKGROUND NOTE 
No. 8/1974 
May 20, 1974 
PROSPECTS FOR MONETARY INTEGRATION IN THE EC 
Following is the text of an address delivered by EC Commission 
Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp before the German Bankers' Convention, 
March 12. 1974, in Bonn, Germany. Haferkarnp is responsible for Huropean 
Community monetary and economic integration. 
Introduction 
It is not easy tmder the present circtmlStances to talk about "Prospect;; 
for Monetary Integration in the European Conmnmi ty." Public opinion is agreed 
that Europe is in a sorry state at present. 
Today, the European Community stands at the crossroads. The events of the last 
few months and the behavior of the governments of the member states have 
disappointed many hopes. In retrospect, one wonders whether all those who 
made solemn declarations about economic and political union were prepared to 
draw all the consequences therefrom. Indeed, it seems doubtful that the 
governments of the member countries have the will and the courage to progress 
further on the road towards European unity and in particular towards monetary 
union. 
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In my opinion, there can be no doubt about the ultimate aim of achievipg 
monetary union and its necessity, although the appropriateness of the methods 
and techniques used up to now, can be questioned. Today, European unity in 
the monetary field is important and urgent as never before, but if we are to 
succeed, we must reconsider the formulas and procedures and adjust them to 
the changed situation. 
In my address today I would like to outline some ideas and proposals before 
this distinguished audience of experts. Perhaps in the past we have too often 
evolved theories on the drawing board. Perhaps we have had too few discussions 
with bankers and those concerned with practical affairs. 
But we must ask ourselves first of all: were the means and objectives of 
monetary integration in the European Community wrong? What were the causes 
of the setbacks and failures? 
2. Aims of Economic and Monetary Union 
A) Any realistic analysis of the situation must begin by examining the 
objectives which the Member States fixed at the beginning of 1971, and 
which they have continually reaffirmed. 
Firstly: the Conmnmity is to progress by stages towards economic:1and monetary 
union, and this should be completed before the end of 1980. 
Secondly: progress in the fields of economic and monetary policy must proceed 
in a parallel manner. 
Thirdly: the Community's organs must acquire the decision-making authority 
requisite to the administration of an economic and monetary union. 
- 3 -
The final objective of economic and monetary union was firmly and clearly 
defined in the Council Decision of 21 March 1971. The aim is to establish an 
integrated economy among all member countries in which there is free movement of 
goods, services, capital and persons, and in which they are subject to the 
same regulations. To achieve this aim, an independent monetary area in which 
there is a common central banking system must emerge within the framework of 
the international monetary system. 
The purpose of monetary cooperation is to eliminate parity changes and to narrow 
the width of the bands within which the value of Community currencies can 
fluctuate. In this way, the conditions for the introduction of a common 
European currency would be fulfilled. 
Initial Experiences in MOnetary Integration 
A) The final objective of monetary integration is undisputed, and, moreover, 
in spite of all the difficultie~some progress towards this goal has been achieved. 
In 1972 the member states agreed on the creation of a European monetary system, 
the so-called "snake in the tunnel," which made an important contribution 
to European monetary stability. In this way, the first steps were taken towards 
the creation of an independent European monetary personality. This strange 
animal, the "European snake," functioned by means of a network of agreements, 
multilateral interventions in Community currencies and dollars, short-term 
credits and rules for the periodic settling of debts between central banks. 
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l In March 1973, the "European snake" was able to function as an effective lement of defense against the influx of dollars and against inflation, as 
Community currencies floated against outside currencies. Within the Community 
this system assured relatively stable exChange rates, as fluctuations in the 
spot rate of Community currencies was not allowed to exceed 2.25 per cent. 1n addition 
in the context of thls European monetary "bloc" some early successes in 
harmonizing national money and credit policies, and particularly interest-rate 
policy, were achieved. 
B) However, no progress was made towards liberalizing capital movements or 
harmonizing the capital market policy of the member states. On the contrary, 
during the first stage, controls on capital movement within the Community 
were increased. It was only recently in the aftermath of the oil crisis that 
~~~same countries have moved to loosen controlS on the importation of capital. 
C) Finally, present plans for the achievement of economic and monetary union 
envisage consultation and endeavors to coordinate as the most important means 
of harmonizing economic and monetary policy in the member states. 
But reality has proven to be quite different. 
Consultations which were to be obligatory, above all in connection with 
adjustments in exchange rates, seldom took place before the actual decision 
was made. In many cases, the other partners could only take note of what a 
member government had already decided. 
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4. Current Prospects 
A) The creation of a monetaT)· area composed of the nine member states 
together with Norway and Sweden, and possibly including Austria and Switzerland, 
. would have meant th~t 70 - 75 per cent of the foreign trade of these countries 
would have taken place at relatively stable exchange rates. This European 
monetary area has not come into being. 
Today we are faced with the fact that instead of moving towards this monetary 
grouping, the present monetary situation is characterized by a tendency to 
disintegrate into national units. Today only five member states-- Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark,and the Federal Republic--and two non-EC 
countries, Norway and Sweden, are still participating in the EC bloc floating. 
B) The intensification of monetary integration as part of the economic and 
monetary union was planned for 1974. With the transition to the second stage 
the tasks and resources of the Kuropean Fund for Monetary Cooperation, founded 
in 1973, were to be increased. The system of short-term credits was to be 
transformed and expanded and the first steps towards the pooling of Community 
monetary reserves taken. 
In addition to this, real progress was to have been made in coordinating 
external monetary policy and domestic money and credit policies, as well as in 
other fields of economic policy. It· was realized that exchange rate adjustments 
could not be excluded in the transitional period, but they were to occur only after 
consultations among the participants. Finally, the Community was to act as a unit 
in its relations with the outside world and to be represented by a single 
speaker in international negotiations and bodies. 
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C) In negotiating the proposals for the second stage of Economic and 
monetary union it became clear that compulsory consultation and coordination 
procedures had no chance of being accepted. The majority of the. governments 
refused to limit the scope of national decision-making. Because of the lack 
of agreement on the size of the regional fund and the criteria to guide its 
use, the formal transition to the second stage of economic and monetary union 
has not yet been approved. substantive decisions, paving the way for the second 
stage, were nevertheless approved by the Council of Ministers on 18 February 
of this year. 
If all the Commission's proposals, including that on the Monetary Fund, had 
been approved by the end of last year, this would certainly have made a 
useful/contribution towards progress in monetary integration. Today there are 
doubts whether the member states are really prepared to harmonize their 
instruments of economic policy and ensure that there is a greater degree of 
convergence of economic policies in the Community. The Council again postponed 
its decision on the proposals for Community polling of currency reserves: 1t 
limited itself to requesting a report from the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors and the Monetary Committee before the end of Marc~ of this year on 
which it intends to take action before the end of June 1974. 
D) The oil crisis and its financial and economic repercussions on the 
economies of the member states have once again put the Community to the test. Up 
to now it has not met this challenge. Different degrees of dependency and 
• repercussions on prices, as well as varying balance of payments and employment 
situations, have further strengthened the tendency of the member states to 
follow a policy of "every man for himself" and "sauve qui peut:" 
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As a result of the increase in the price of oi~ the balance of payments of 
EC countries as a whole in 1974 will deteriorate by approximately fifteen to 
twenty billion dollars. The countries concerned have attempted to deal with 
this situation in different ways: some have tried to raise billions on 
t~e international capital market, to increase their swap agreements with the 
US reserve system, to make use of IMF credits, or to let their exc~ange rates 
float downwards. Others have liberalized capital import controls and pointed 
to their comfortable cushion of large foreign exchange reserves. Instead 
of working out joint strategies to overcome the crisis, everyone is looking for 
national advantage. Instead of acting together, everyone is betting on national 
economic and monetary policies. 
5. The Causes for the Deadlock and Setbacks in MOnetary Integration 
A) The picture of the present situation and prospects for European integration 
is a gloomy one. The possibility that monetary disintegration will continue 
cannot be excluded. 
It is therefore even more important to ask the question: Has the road toward 
economic and monetary union begun in 1971 become impassable? Were those the 
wrong concepts and methods for achieving economic and monetary union? What 
caused things to go astray? 
B) The first reason has become clear today. We began monetary 
integration in Europe too late. As long as the Bretton Woods system continued 
to function, monetary unity was certainly important but only a long-term aim 
of integration efforts. 
First of all we wanted to harmonize the instruments and objectives of economic 
policy and initial structural conditions. First, the policies of 
the states and of both sides of industry were to be harmonized. 
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The creation of an independent European monetary system and a common currency 
would then have been the crowning accomplishment in achieving European economic 
un:i,.fication. 
Now we know that we have lost a lot of time. I hope not irretrievably! 
Today the problems now present themselves differently. We now need 
economic and monetary union to call a halt to the continual destruction of the 
international monetary system and to serve as a rallying point for forces 
pushing for the creation of a new monetary order. 
C) The second reason for the unsatisfactory functioning of the European 
monetary arrangements as they presently exist is that there has been insufficient 
coordination of economic objectives and instruments. 
So long as there are differences in economic priorities, so long as one 
country regards economic growth as·of paramount importance and another sees 
price stability as crucia~ and so long as cost and price trends diffe~there 
will be disequilibria in the balance of payments which will make exchange rate 
adjustments necessary. If real progress towards economic and monetary union is 
to be achieved, then the objectives of economic policy must be made compatible, 
the instruments at the disposal of the member countries must be harmonized, and 
finally the objectives fixed by common accord mu5t be implemented and the 
member states must jointly accept responsibility for them. 
To achieve greater convergence of economic trends and of policy goals and 
instruments also necessitates harmonization of the different basic social and 
regional structures. This means that those countries having a sound economic 
structure,,must aid the weaker partners and regions, in other words that a 
European adjustment mechanism extending to agricultural, socia~ and regional 
policy must be created. A condition of providing aid for others is however the 
right of all to participate in formulating and implementing policy. 
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D) The third reason for the failures in economic and monetary integration· 
is to be found in the lack of decision-making structures at the Community 
level. Consultative bodies and non-binding procedures are insufficient to 
impose joint action. The harmonization of the central objectives of short-
term economic stabilization and employment policy in the member countries will 
not be accomplished by consultation. Rather, it is necessary to transfer 
national powers step by step to Community organs and in this way to put the 
objectives of economic, monetary, and foreign policy fixed by the Conmrunity 
into practice. The challenges of the present energy crisis show painfully 
how little the Community is presently capable of asserting its political and 
economic strength. 
But it is precisely at this point, when it comes to renouncing national 
sovereignty, that all Governments shrink back and refuse to admit to themselves 
that they have already lost part of their national autonomy as a result of the 
high degree of economic interdependence. Even without the energy crisis at the 
end of 1973 it would have been impossible to overlook the fact that for more 
than a year the Council of Ministers had been putting off virtually all 
important decisions. The real reason for this situation is fear of the 
politico-institutional consequences which an effective policy at Community level 
would entail. The gap between the declarations of intent by politicians and 
the actual progress achieved is growing ever wider, and the credibility of the 
integration aims: continually smaller. 
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6. New Ways to Achieve MOnetary Union 
A) It must be emphasized here once again that we cannot abandon the goal 
of economic and monetary union, even if we must find new methods to achieve· 
this. A common market requires a common and stable basis for calculating the 
costs of trade, and planning production and investment. Without this, there is 
a continual danger of a retrograde development and disintegration. 
The Common Market is only viable in the long run if it proceeds to develop 
further into an economic and monetary union. Otherwise there is a danger that 
it would regress into a free trade area. The dismantling of the Common Market 
could well take place faster than one might imagine today and under these 
circtnTIStances we would no longer need to concern ourselves with European inte-
gration. 
We are therefore faced with the question of how we now intend to achieve 
this final objective of economic and monetary union. 
B) The European Comnrunity plays a decisive role in the world economy. It must 
therefore assume a corresponding responsibility for the orderly functioning 
of the world's economy, a duty which will be all the more crucial if the inter-
national economic system threatens to disintegrate. We have been able to put 
this off for a long time because the Bretton Woods agreement functioned tolerably 
well, but today swift action towards monetary cooperation is imperative. 
· The Commission must give priority to progressing towards economic and 
monetary union. That may sound Utopian, but in reality it is the alternative 
Utopian: that is, in other words, to wait until the "20" or "30" have agreed 
on a new world monetary system. If we wait any longer we are in danger of 
gambling away the results of European integration, the unification of the 
markets of the member states. 
But what can we do? 
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C) In my opinion the Community must realize three things: 
Firstly: with the disappearance of the worldwide monetary order we in the 
Conmrunity need .a new method of integration. Up to now we have worked towards 
the integration of markets, sectors, and regions. Now we need in addition to 
these endeavors a new agent of integration in the form of monetary unification. 
Secondly: monetary integration has -- contrary to appearances -- a good chance 
of success, if it bec6mes less committed to finding ideal institutional and 
procedural solutions than previously: Plans for economic and monetary union 
have up.to now been largely conceived on the theoretical level, with little 
attention to practical realities. 
These plans lacked sufficient links with the market, bank~ and entrepreneur~ 
which already operate on a European scale extending across national borders. The 
present dangerous situation requires that central banks and the major commercial 
banks must coordinate their activities on a European level more than hitherto. 
Theoretically conceived plans and timetables must be replaced by a penrulllent 
coordination of behavior -- a European monetary dialogue -- with the aim of 
achieving a common monetary policy towards the rest of the world. 
Thirdly: structural and regional policy -- which have already been mentioned --
must also get away from idealistic theoretical models. We need a liberalized 
European capital market to even out differences in productivity and to correct 
structural problems. The planned European Regiopal Fund would be hopelessly 
overburdened if it were supposed to achieve this by itself. Indeed, one of 
the essential reasons for the epic struggle of politicians may also be found 
in this misconception of the Fund's tasks. Our aim should rather be to mobilize 
European capital markets to meet this challenge; to end the days of Europe 
being merely a center for the distribution of foreign capital. 
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D) Above all the member countries must now face together the pressing danger 
of a further disintegration of the international monetary system. In view 
of the uncertainties in the monetary situation and the imminent changes in 
balance of payments .conditions in the'industrial countries, it would not be a 
disaster if we had to live for a longer period with floating exchange rates. It 
would be a disaster only if our exchange rates were to increasingly fluctuate 
in response to the inves'tment preferences of the oil producers. We nrust therefore 
establish same order among these flexible exchange rates by means of a mutually 
coordinated policy. It will take some time before this happens within the frame-
work of in~ernational monetary reform. In the meantime, close monetary 
cooperation between the EC and the most important industrial states, above all 
with the United States,, is essential. This kind of concerted effort, which 
would also be directed towards cooperation with the oil-producing countries, 
could make an important and stabilizing contribution to international monetary 
relations. And that would be in everyone's interest., 
A glance at events in the monetary field in 1973 ~how how necessary this is. 
Since May 1973 for example the value of the dollar in terms of the currencies 
of the European float has fluctuated by more than 20 per cent, only to return at 
present to its level of March of last year. This instability was neither in the 
interests of the United States, of <liher industrial states, nor of countries 
producing raw materials. The consequences of the rise in oil prices and continuing 
speculation in gold lead one to fear that this monetary instability will continue. 
For this reason, it is vital that the exchange rates between important trading 
partners should no longer be. subject to arbitrary changes and exaggerated movements. 
This necessitates a more comprehensive system of rules and agreements than before. 
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Cooperation between the EC and the United States, as well as any other 
interested party, in the field of monetary affairs, could ensure a minimum of 
international monetary order and minimize the risk of a world-wide recession 
as a result of the cunrulative effects of "beggar-my-neighbor" policies. Such 
a contribution to stability would also make it easier for the countries floating 
individually to maintain a sensible exchange rate. The experiences of 1973 
pointed to the fact that undisciplined floating has tended to increase domestic 
inflationary tendencies and to promote speculation in raw materials. 
7. Conclusions 
It would be wrong to prophesy the collapse and disintegration of the European 
Conummity. But the member countries must not only combat the continuing 
weakening of the Community; they must also come to regard the Community as one 
of the last pillars which must not be allowed to collapse, if they are to continue 
.. 
to enjoy a minimum of monetary stability. Progress towards the realization of 
economic and monetary union is, however, also a positive contribution towards the 
re-establishment of orderly monetary and commercial relations in the world. 
A Community which is economically so very·dependent on the rest of the 
world must necessarily have a fundamental interest in a stable world economic 
system. 
Setbacks with domestic economies too or even a standstill on the road 
towards monetary integration in the Community would bring dangers and risks for 
all member countries. There is no alternative to the economic and monetary 
unification of Europe. Disintegration and the retreat into national solutions 
would have economic, social, and political costs which no member state could 
afford to pay. There is therefore only the road forwards towards an economic 
and monetary unity in Europe. 
• 
- 14 -
The govenunents of the member countries do not have IIUlCh more time in 
which to meet this challenge. The political and economic forces in the world 
are in the process of changing, and Europe will no longer be able to play a role 
if the European states continue to try and solve today's problems with yesterday's 
ideas and instruments. The opportunity and the need for a new beginning are 
present in the challenge of creating a European monetary union using new and 
unconventional methods. Whether we make use of the opportunity depends not 
least of all on you. 
